To explain cross-country differences in economic performance, the economics of coordination failures typically portrays each country in a closed economy model with multiple equilibria and then argues that the poor countries are in an equilibrium inferior to those achieved by the rich. This approach cannot tell us anything about the degree of inequality in the world economy.
1.

Introduction.
One major challenge for the theory of economic development is to explain the diversity of economic performances across the countries. In short, "why Are
There Rich and Poor Countries?" The economics of coordination failures attempts to answer this question by developing a model of multiple equilibria, and arguing that the Rich countries somehow managed to achieve a Pareto-superior equilibrium, while the Poor countries fail to achieve a necessary coordination and are trapped in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
The most influential work along this line is Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989 For example, in a series of papers, I studied dynamic models of development with multiple steady states: Matsuyama (1991 Matsuyama ( , 1992 ; see also Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) . In these models, the initial condition of the economy plays an important role in determining the eventual state toward which the economy will gravitate (without entirely ruling out the possibility of "economic miracles, " or "takeOffsfl, i.e., some comtries may occasionally escape from the poverty trap and join the club of the Rich countries) . These dynamic models thus help to explain why the cross-country differences could be self-perpetuating and sometimes tend to magnify over time, and, at the same time, they are consistent with a few observations of IIeconomic miracles. " Nevertheless, these studies do not explicitly model a mechanism of generating the initial cross-country differences, and hence come short of offering an answer to the question, "Why Are There Rich Matsuyama (1995, pp.720-721) . Hence, this paper can be viewed as its elaboration and its extension.
In the next section, I lay out the physical structure of the world economy.
The building blocks of the model are fairly standard, so that I refrain from discussing specification issues in detail. The purpose of this section is rather to establish the notations, and highlight the key features of the model. In section 3, I discuss the equilibrium allocation under autarky. In section 4, I
look at the world economy in equilibrium. In section 5, I discuss some implications of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2.
The Physical Structure of the World Economy.
The world economy consists of a continuum of identical small countries.
Each country is endowed with L units of labor, which is the only primary factor of production. There are three consumption goods, 1, 2, and 3. Good 1 and Good 2 are tradeable, while Good 3 is nontradeable. goods sector, the production cost declines with N, implies that the cost declines faster in Sector 2
Since all the inputs are priced equally and enter symmetrically in the production functions, all the input producing firms operate at the same scale,
x(z) = x, and earns the same revenue and the profit, By denoting the revenue of a firm by S = px = Wx, its wage bill B and its profit 11 are expressed as
and n=s-B=~-wF.
respectively.
Finally, there is no barrier to entry or to exit in the intermediate inputs sector, which make all the input producing firms earn zero profit in equilibrium.
3. The Autarkv Equilibrium.
Although the ultimate goal of the analysis is to examine the world economy, consisting of a continuum of small open economies, let us first look at the equilibrium allocation of each economy in autarky, which offers a useful benchmark for the subsequent analysis.
Because of the Cobb-Douglas preferences, all the consumption goods must be consumed by a positive amount. Hence, in the absence of trade, each economy must produce all the consumption goods, which means that their prices must be equal to their costs: that is, from (4),
Since the representative consumer spends~iY on Good i, and Sector i spends 100ai% of its revenue on intermediate inputs, the total revenue of the inputs sector is where (8)
represents the share of the intermediates sector in the aggregate income in autarky.
(Here, superscript A stands for Autarky.) This parameter can also be interpreted as the degree of the aggregate demand externality, measuring the extent to which an increase in the aggregate income generates additional revenue to the monopolistically competitive inputs sector.
Likewise, Sector i spends 100(l-ai)% of its revenue on labor, wage income satisfies,
where use has been made of (5) and (9) . Combining (8) and (10) (7) and (11),
and, by inserting (14) and (15) For each small open economy the relative price of Good 1 and Good 2, q = pl/p2, is exogenously given in the world market. Unlike in autarky, whether the economy produces Good 1 or Good 2 now depends on the ratio of the production cost in the two sectors, From (4), it can be expressed as 2see Rodrzguez-clare (1993 Rodrzguez-clare ( , 1996 and Rodrik (1996) for the analysis of similar models of a small open economy. The total revenue of the inputs sector thus can be written as
where
represents the degree of the aggregate demand externality when N < N(q) .
(Superscript 1 indicates that, of the two tradeable goods, the economy specializes in Good 1.) Likewise, the wage income can be written as
'N[(l-+)s+ wFl+(l-e')y" '20)
Solving (18) 
Unlike in the autarky case, the revenue of a firm, and hence its profit, no longer declines monotonically with the number of firms. This is because an entry of firms, when it pushes the economy over the threshold level, causes a shift in comparative advantage, which increases the aggregate demand for the intermediate inputs. 
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Note that the lower bound is less than one, while the upper bound is one. Therefore, international trade can cause the drastic change in even without affecting the relative price of the tradeable goods. 
.(,, =~, D,
[-1 l-f , elL& OF which is depicted in Figure 3 as an upward-sloping curve.
At the intersection of the two curves, the relative price of Good 1, q*, is smaller than its relative production cost for the f* fraction of the economies, hence these economies specialize in the relative production cost in the rest of the Good 2, while q* is greater than world economy, which specializes in Good 1. The intersection, (f*, q'), thus depicts an equilibrium of the world economy.4
It is easy to see tiy point on the upward that the equilibrium of the world economy is not unique. 4A similar geometrical representation of the equilibrium is used in yanagawa (1996) in his model of a world economy with a continuum of countries.
5.
Discussions .
Despite a plethora of equilibrium, indexed by f~[f-, f+] , the equilibrium conditions impose such strong restrictions on possible allocations that the model is rich in its implications, which will be discussed in this section.
5-A.
Cross-Country Comparisons.
One major implication of the model, indeed the main purpose of building this model, is that, without any innate differences across the countries, some countries (at least 1 -f+ fraction of the world economy) must be in the first equilibrium and others
The model thus offers a (at least theory of f-fraction) must be in the second equilibrium.
endogenous variations across the countries; two different types of economies w co-exist in the world economy. Therefore, it makes sense to talk about cross-country comparisons.
First, let us look at the differences in The mere fact that international trade made some countries poorer than others does not necessarily answer this, we must compare imply that trade made them poorer than before. To the utility levels before and after the trade. From 5Although the factor mobility plays no role in creating the cross-country differences in this model, introducing a mobile factor might be an interesting extension of the model. For example, suppose that there are two factors, immobile labor L, and mobile capital K, which jointly forms a "generalized factor, " Z = F(K,L).
If the restriction of capital mobility is imposed, then the present model can be directly applied by reinterpreted by replacing L by Z. Then, if we allow capital to mover then capital flows from the Poor to the Rich, which offers an answer to the question posed by Lucas (1990) . And the resulting capital outflow magnifies the wage difference across the two regions. The same argument can be applied here.
(Indeed, Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) barriera.
The Effects of Development Strategies: A Global Perspective.
In 5-C, I have discussed a few policy options the government might want to take in order to facilitate successful development, from the perspective of an individual country.
These policies cannot make all the countries rich, but may work for some countries. Although the model is silent about which countries can succeed, it is useful for thinking about the possible spillover effects of such an "economic miracle. "
To simplify the argument, I will assume that, once some countries succeeded in moving from the bad equilibrium to the good equilibrium, they remove all the interventions that helped them become Rich. As more countries manage to join the club of the Rich countries, f increases along the upward-sloping curve in Figure   3 . As a result, q goes up and the terms of trade move in favor of the countries, Furthermore, the terms of trade effect of such an "economic miracle" on the countries who remain Poor may be a mixed blessing.
As an improvement in their terms of trade, the Poor countries benefit from an increase in q, provided that they remain Poor. However, an increase in q, by raising the threshold level of development, N(q), makes their chance of a successful development smaller. As discussed above, the effectiveness of the government announcement to direct a coordination among the private firms harder as the gap between Nl and N(q) grows.
The bigger gap also implies that a bigger intervention is required to eliminate the bad equilibrium. Furthermore, an increase in q could lead to NA K N(q) , so that the return to the temporary autarky may no longer generate a sufficient industry base, when the economy removes the trade barriers. In summary, a successful industrialization in some countries, and more generally the presence of early industrializers, may help the Poor agricultural producers by causing a favorable terms of trade change, and yet makes it harder for them to follow. One can modify the model, such as adding monopolistic competitive tradeable goods, so that there exist some benefits of trading in a larger world.
Then, when countries became Poorer in the union, they have an incentive to drop out of the union, because, if they had to be poorer, they would rather be poorer in a larger trading community. 
